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The  transitional  economies  of  the  Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU)  have  enjoyed  an  extraordinary 
period of growth and poverty reduction between 2000 and 2007 and this occurred in concomitance 
with significant increases in private and public transfers to households. The paper assesses the 
relative importance of these transfers for welfare and poverty in Moldova, the poorest country in 
Europe.  A  longitudinal  analysis  based  on  panel  data  reveals  that  private  transfers  and  social 
insurance  transfers  are  effective  in  improving  welfare  and  reducing  poverty  whereas  social 
assistance transfers have little or no effect. Social insurance and social assistance seem to have 
swapped roles. Social insurance is most relevant for lifting people out of poverty while social 
assistance - if anything - has a small role in protecting the non-poor from falling into poverty. We 
also find that the different types of transfers do not crowd-out each other and that social insurance 
may in fact reinforce the capacity of private transfers to reduce poverty. Such findings have several 
policy implications for the near future: a) Poor households in FSU transitional economies remain 
highly vulnerable to shocks in public and private transfers; b) the 2008-2009 recession is likely to 
expose this vulnerability and result in a surge in poverty larger than expected and c) the social 
assistance  systems  remain  in  great  need  of  pro-poor  reforms  and  cannot  currently  provide  an 
adequate protection from economic shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The first decade of the transition from socialism to capitalism has been very hard for the countries 
of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). All the fifteen republics that constituted the union experienced 
a deep recession between 1990 and 1995 with an average fall in GDP of about 40%. As they were 
starting to recover in 1996 and 1997, Russia defaulted on its debt and unleashed a financial crisis 
that reached all FSU republics with a subsequent new fall in GDP of several percentage points. 
Hidden and open unemployment and poverty increased consistently during the decade leading to a 
severe decline in living standards (World Bank, 2005). Understandably, the populations of these 
countries have lived the 1990s as a painful experience that overshadowed the initial enthusiasm for 
reforms. 
 
At  the  turn  of  the  century,  these  sentiments  translated  into  political  opposition  for  those 
governments  that  managed  the  reforms.  In  authoritarian  states,  where  the  former  communists 
maintained  power  throughout  the  1990s,  political  oppositions  have  been  either  silenced  by 
different degrees of force (Uzbekistan, Belorussia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Russia) or emerged 
in the form of peaceful revolutions (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan). In less authoritarian states, 
where reforms have been managed by new reformist coalitions, these changes occurred in the form 
of a resurgence of communist parties (Moldova, Lithuania). Whatever the political process, fifteen 
years into the transition period the former communists still firmly control most of the political 
establishments across the FSU, an outcome that very few could anticipate in 1991. 
 
The same economic reforms despised by the populations that suffered the immediate consequences 
of  such  reforms  and  the  devaluation  of  the  currencies  occurred  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1998 
financial crisis created the pre-conditions for the new growth era that emerged at the turn of the 
century. All FSU economies enjoyed positive and sustained growth rates between 2000 and 2007 
and the post-communist governments that found themselves in power at the beginning of the new 
millennium benefitted from a favourable economic climate and from growing resources, including   3 
rising  budget  revenues.  In  many  countries,  growth  and  increased  public  spending  also  led  to 
significant reductions in poverty. 
 
The determinants of the recent growth phase and the success in reducing poverty derive from a 
combination  of  factors  whose  relative  importance  is  still  uncertain.  Macroeconomic  stability 
contributed to create the preconditions for growth. Enterprise restructuring and the consequent 
increase  in  production  and  productivity  played  a  role,  particularly  in  modern  sectors  such  as 
finance and banking. And many industrial sectors went through important structural changes that 
led to better competitiveness. These changes resulted in improved productivity and higher wages 
but produced very few new jobs to an extent that the 2000-2007 growth period has been labelled 
by many as the ‘jobless growth’ period (World Bank, 2005b). 
 
In parallel to the restructuring process, FSU republics also benefitted from a great increase in 
remittances from abroad, an outcome of the prolonged emigration flows that characterized the 
1990s and continued to characterize the poorest of the FSU republics in the new millennium. In 
some countries, this inflow of fresh cash explained a sizable part of growth. GDP growth, in turn, 
raised  budget  revenues  and  budget  spending,  particularly  in  those  countries  where  former 
communists managed to regain power and adopt a populist agenda.  
 
Nowhere the trends described have been more evident than in Moldova, the country we will focus 
on. This is the economy that experienced the worst recession on record during the 1990s and is 
today the poorest country of Europe; it is the transitional country that had the largest migration 
relative to its population and that today benefits the most from remittances as a share of GDP; and 
it is one of the countries that expanded very significantly public transfers in terms of coverage and 
expenditure during the growth phase. In addition and to our advantage, Moldova has a reliable 
household budget survey containing a panel component and covering the entire growth period. 
 
There are two questions related to the recent growth period in transitional economies that we wish   4 
to explore with the Moldova case. The first question is about the relative importance of public and 
private transfers in explaining improvements in welfare and poverty reduction.
1 If private and 
public  transfers  had  a  key  role  in  reducing  poverty,  the  sustainability  of  poverty  reduction  is 
questioned and may explain why poverty reduction has stalled in many countries between 2004 
and 2007. Moreover, the most recent 2008-2009 crisis has deeply affected transitional economies 
and public revenues have collapsed together with public spending. If, during the growth period, 
poverty reduction largely relied on private and public transfers, we should expect a new surge in 
poverty in the years to come. 
 
The second question is more subtle but nevertheless relevant. When public transfers increase one 
should expect a certain crowding-out of private transfers. Private transfers can be driven by selfish 
(reciprocity)  or  unselfish  motives  (charity).  In  both  cases  and  particularly  for  those  private 
transfers motivated by charity, an increase in public spending should somehow reduce the need for 
private  transfers.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  elasticity  of  consumption  to  private  transfers  may  be 
different for households that receive both types of transfers as compared to households receiving 
only  private  transfers.  This  is  a  long  debated  issue  in  public  economics  in  developed  and 
developing countries (Cox and Jakubson, 1995, Cox et al., 2004) but little explored in transitional 
economy. The longitudinal model that we will propose should allow us to gain some insights into 
this issue. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly review some of 
the evidence on the role of public and private transfers in transitional economies. In section 3 we 
describe the case of Moldova. In section 4 we introduce the data set and key variables and in 
section 5 we provide basic statistics and trends for the main aggregates. In section 6, we assess 
transitions in and out of transfers and in and out of poverty using different forms of transition 
matrixes. In section 7, we turn to fixed effects panel equations and provide parametric evidence on 
the role of transfers for welfare and poverty. Section 8 concludes. 
   5 
2. Some evidence on public and private transfers in transition 
 
Evaluations of public transfers worldwide have mainly taken the form of incidence evaluations 
where household consumption is assessed in the presence and absence of transfers. These types of 
evaluation are almost unanimous in attributing to public transfers a positive and significant effect 
on  household  welfare  (Danziger  et  al.,  1981,  Weinberg,  1991)  but  suffer  from  the  fact  that 
behavioural effects are not usually taken into account. That is because public transfers programs 
are very rarely designed with in-built randomized experiments able to deliver a proper impact 
evaluation while ex-post evaluations based on survey data are often inadequate to provide a proper 
counterfactual.  
 
Efforts to carry out impact evaluations of social programs multiplied in recent years after the 
seminal works of Heckman and colleagues (see for example Heckman et al. 2007, 2008)
2 but this 
new wave of evaluations tended to focus on specific programs for selected group of beneficiaries 
where behavioural effects are easier to isolate while impact evaluations of broad social transfers 
programs remained scarce. A recent review of DFID interventions in the area of social transfers 
(Davies, 2009) concluded that “Evidence gathering on the impacts of social transfers has, until 
recently, not been given adequate attention in the design of DFID supported programmes. Few 
schemes,  either  projects  or  national  Government  schemes  have  made  any  serious  attempt  to 
quantify the impacts of social transfers, especially in terms of poverty reduction and economic 
growth.  Social  transfer  schemes  have  a  tendency  to  monitor  ‘process’  indicators  (inputs  and 
activities) rather than ‘impact’ indicators (outputs and attributable changes in beneficiary well-
being).” (page X). 
 
Evaluations of public transfers in transitional economies suffer from similar problems with the 
additional disadvantage that proper data are scarcer and randomized experiments are non-existent. 
To our knowledge, these evaluations are not numerous, focused mainly on the recession phase of 
the  1990s  and  offer  a  mixed  picture  on  the  welfare  improving  capacity  of  public  transfers.   6 
Milanovic (2000) looked at social protection transfers in Latvia and found a weak pro-poor role of 
social protection benefits. Lokshin and Ravallion (2000) analyzed the role of the social safety net 
in protecting the poor from the 1998 Russian financial crisis and concluded that the social safety 
net in place was largely insufficient to protect the poor from the Russian crisis. Ravallion et al. 
(1995) looked at the early years of the transition in Hungary and found that the safety net was able 
to protect effectively from poverty but did not play an important role in lifting people out of 
poverty. Van de Walle (2004) followed in the steps of this last paper to test the public safety net in 
Vietnam and found a very marginal role of the social safety net in protecting people from poverty 
or promoting an exit from poverty. Okrasa (1999a and 1999b) has looked at social benefits in 
Poland and found a general positive impact on redistribution, a positive but moderate impact on 
reducing the poverty spell and a positive impact on exiting poverty with all these effects being 
different depending on the household prototype considered. Dabalen et al. (2008) have looked at a 
social assistance program in Albania (Ndihma Ekonomike) and tested the poverty implications as 
compared  to  the  old-age  pension  program  using  the  pooled  2002  and  2005  living  standards 
surveys. They find a negative impact of the program on poverty and a higher level of discontent 
with  life  with  program  participants  as  compared  to  a  control  group.  Using  the  same  data  for 
Albania and a different approach, Mangiavacchi and Verme (2009) found a very similar result with 
a negative impact on welfare of the Ndihma Ekonomike program. 
 
The evaluation of public transfers in transitional economies has also its own peculiarities. Unlike 
developing countries, transitional economies during the socialist period had already established a 
complex  system  of  public  transfers  based  on  categorical  principles  which  focused  mainly  on 
children, disabled and war veterans. These countries were also characterised by low levels of 
poverty  and  inequality  and  good  standards  in  the  education  and  health  sectors.  The  transition 
toward a market economy and the subsequent recession, unemployment growth and reduction in 
budget revenues confronted these economies with unprecedented challenges with rising poverty 
and inequality and falling standards in the provision of public services which transformed the old 
social  protection  systems  in  obsolete  institutions.  These  systems  needed  to  be  restructured  by   7 
moving from categorical types of systems to means-tested and poverty oriented systems.  
 
Evaluations of private transfers in transitional economies are also very few and we are not aware 
of studies that looked at public and private transfers in conjunction. The economic recessions of 
the 1990s have fostered two major phenomena related to private transfers. One is the expansion of 
inter-household  exchanges  as  a  form  of  protection  from  economic  shocks  and  the  second  is 
remittances from abroad, consequence of profound and prolonged periods of outmigration. A study 
on Russia has shown for example how pensions can play an important role in inter-household 
redistribution  in  addition  to  intra-household  redistribution  (Kuhn  and  Stillman,  2004).  More 
importantly,  remittances  from  abroad  have  come  to  play  a  major  role  in  the  poorest  of  the 
transitional  economies  becoming  for  some  countries  one  of  the  major  sources  of  growth 
(Korovilas, 1999) and contributing significantly in other countries to improvements in household 
welfare (Nguyen-Viet 2008). These types of transfers continued and increased during the growth 
phase and complemented government transfers as an important source of household income.  
 
Finally, it is important to stress the difference between private transfers, social insurance and social 
assistance when it comes to policy. The role of the government in relation to these three types of 
transfers  is  clearly  different.  Private  transfers  represent  an  important  source  of  growth  for 
transitional economies and the role of public policies is to encourage such flows while attempting 
to  make  these  flows  more  formal  and  taxable.  Effective  policies  towards  private  transfers, 
especially remittances from abroad, should find a balance between these two objectives. The main 
policy objective for social insurance is to guarantee a sustainable system where revenues are able 
to cover expenditure in the long-run and where pensions maintain an appropriate value in real 
terms over time. Instead, the main policy objective of social assistance is to cater for the poor and 
vulnerable  providing  an  adequate  safety  net  for  people  in  need.  From  a  pure  public  policy 
perspective, it is only social assistance that has the mandate to reduce poverty whereas public 
policies in the areas of private transfers and social insurance can contribute to this objective but 
they are not primarly designed for such scope.  When we evaluate these three types of transfers we   8 
should keep this consideration in mind. 
 
3. The case of Moldova 
 
Moldova is an extreme example of the transitional ‘path’ experienced by the countries of the 
Former  Soviet  Union  (FSU).  After  the  desegregation  of  the  Union  in  1991,  the  country  went 
through a deep recession between 1991 and 1995, two years of stabilization between 1996 and 
1997 and a new smaller recession in the aftermath of the 1998 Russian financial crisis. By 1999, 
the country had lost over 60% of its GDP
3 as compared to 1990 and poverty stood at 71% of the 
population (World Bank, 2004). Economic recovery really started only in the year 2000 and the 
gains since then have been remarkable. Annual growth rates between 2000 and 2007 have been - 
on average - around 7% and poverty declined rapidly to around 26% of the population by 2004 
(Government of Moldova, 2004).  
 
These epochal swings in output and poverty during the first decade of the transition period left 
little space for addressing institutional issues such as the reform of the social protection system. 
Both  the  social  insurance  and  the  social  assistance  systems  were  in  need  of  reforms  as  these 
systems  were  no  longer  suitable  to  address  new  emerging  issues  such  as  unemployment  and 
poverty.  
 
The system of social insurance contributions needed to be entirely reformed because its former 
structure  under  socialism  was  unsustainable.  The  Soviet  Union  guaranteed  generous  old  aged 
pensions to all retirees. These pensions were paid by the state with only nominal contributions on 
the part of enterprises (which were state property) so that the system could have been described as 
a Pay-As-You-GO (PAYGO) system with current revenues paying for current expenditures. With 
the process of transition towards a market economy, some enterprises collapsed, some remained 
state property, some were privatised and others were created. All types of enterprises continued to 
be required to pay social insurance contributions but not all enterprises did so or complied only in   9 
part. This made the system unsustainable and the authorities first started to reform social insurance 
for the public servants (1995) and then moved on with the reform for other insured persons (1998, 
1999). Reforms focused on balancing revenues and expenditures of the newly created pension fund 
but the system remained in essence PAYGO and the state budget continued to cover the pension 
fund deficits and this contributed to the maintenance of reasonable pensions. 
 
Social assistance was also in need of reforms able to shift the system from a categorical type to a 
means-tested type of system. Social assistance benefits under the Soviet Union were typically 
lower than pensions but still generous, particularly for children and the war veterans. With the 
transition period, the number of beneficiaries increased while the budget for social assistance was 
being reduced. This translated in very low levels of transfers per beneficiary making the need for 
reforms towards a means-tested system – a system able to cater for the poor and avoid dispersing 
scarce resources on the non-poor - even more urgent. These reforms could not be implemented 
during  the  1990s  with  the  result  that  pensions  contributions  remained  scarce  in  the  face  of 
generous  pension  payments  while  the  existing  resources  for  social  assistance  became  diluted 
across increasing numbers of beneficiaries. 
 
The beginning of the new growth period in 2001 coincided with the re-election of a communist 
government and the combination of increasing resources and a communist agenda determined a net 
growth in public spending in all areas including social insurance and social assistance. Despite 
these positive changes, the social protection system remained largely unchanged with significant 
reforms being implemented only for pensions. The social assistance system until 2007 continued to 
include  a  wealth  of  categorical  benefits  mainly  targeted  at  children,  the  disabled  and  the  war 
veterans with no means-tests or proxy-means tests in place. In substance, benefits increased and 
continued to target categories presumed to be vulnerable but not necessarily poor.  
 
The  expansion  of  public  transfers  initiated  by  the  new  government  in  2001  has  also  been 
accompanied by a remarkable increase in remittances from abroad and inter-household transfers.   10 
There are scattered data on out-migration during the 1990s but one of the peculiarities of Moldova 
is that emigration increased four folds between 1999 and 2004. By 2004, remittances from abroad 
accounted for 27% of GDP, an increase of almost 100% from 2000 (IMF, 2006). Interestingly and 
as in other transitional economies (Verme, 2006), the growth phase has also been characterized by 
modest job creation. Real wages have increased and contributed to improve household welfare but 
only  few  jobs  were  being  created  and  income  from  transfers  (public  and  private)  increased 
relatively to income from work making households more reliant on transfers. 
 
The concomitant increase in public and private transfers during a period of sustained growth and 
little job creation raises several questions on what may have really driven poverty reduction. Do 
public and private transfers explain improvements in welfare and poverty? 
 
In  addressing  this  question  we  face  a  number  of  critical  issues.  We  are  confronted  with  a 
retrospective evaluation. There was no design to evaluate transfers ex-ante and we cannot rely on a 
randomized experiment and/or household surveys which were specifically designed for evaluating 
transfers. We face therefore most of the problems that ex-post evaluations share including selection 
bias,  lack  of  a  proper  comparison  group,  unobserved  heterogeneity,  model  endogeneity  and 
measurement  error.  We  do  not  know  what  drives  the  household  decision  to  apply  to  certain 
transfers such as social assistance and we do not have any information about those households who 
applied for benefits but were rejected. Nor we know about the motives and criteria that people 
working abroad use for deciding about size and beneficiaries of remittances. Several factors that 
may determine program selection are not observed in our data such as the improper or illegal 
selection mechanisms used by administrators of public transfers. We cannot always distinguish 
those  variables  that  determine  the  household  decision  from  those  variables  that  determine  the 
government decision. For example, having many children may be a factor that induces households 
to apply for benefits because poor households tend to have many children but is also a categorical 
criteria used by the government to assign benefits. A proper matching design is also unlikely given 
that we do not have a parallel survey to extract matches from and that the extraction of matches   11 
from the survey we use would result in self-selection on observables in addition to self-selection 
on non-observables. These are not exceptional circumstances for an evaluation of government 
transfers  in  transitional  economies  and  explain  the  scarcity  of  impact  evaluations  in  these 
countries. 
 
As it was the case for other studies of public and private transfers in transitional economies, we 
need to be less ambitious and rely on a combination of tested tools that taken together could 
provide  some  useful  insights  into  the  relevance  of  private  and  public  transfers  for  welfare  in 
Moldova.  We  propose  first  a  look  at  trends  of  the  main  aggregates  and  an  analysis  of  the 
distribution of transfers. We then assess household mobility in and out of transfers and the role of 
this mobility in explaining changes in poverty using two forms of transition matrixes and the panel 
component of the survey adopted. These same matrixes will also be used to estimate two indexes 
proposed by Ravallion e al. (2005) to measure the likelihood of transfers to protect people from 
poverty and to promote an exit from poverty. Last, we will use a fixed effects panel model to 
estimate the elasticity of consumption to changes in transfers partly accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity  and  moving  closer  to  an  impact  type  evaluation.  This  cannot  fully  account  for 





The analysis that we propose is based on four rounds of the Moldova Household Budget Survey 
(MHBS), 2001-2004. The period was chosen because it covers the entire first mandate of the new 
government elected in 2001 allowing for an assessment of the public spending strategy followed 
by this particular government. The survey initiated in 1997 with World Bank support, contains a 
panel component and is administered by the National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova. It covers 
approximately  6,240  households  every  year  interviewed  in  monthly  blocks  of  520  households 
each.  The  panel  component  has  an  elaborate  rotation  scheme  and  a  maximum  tenure  of  each 
household of four years. We are able therefore to follow the same group of households throughout   12 
the four years’ period considered.
5  
 
The survey is a multi-stage sampling and multi-purpose survey and includes sections on income 
and consumption. We base the analysis on households rather than individuals because public and 
private transfers are mostly household based and cannot be attributed with precision to individuals. 
The National Bureau of Statistics of Moldova considers households as people living together at the 
same address and sharing the same financial resources. The welfare measure used is household 
consumption per capita, which is what the World Bank has used for its 2004 poverty assessment of 
Moldova (World Bank, 2004). Consumption is adjusted with the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
the  period  2001-2004  using  2001  as  base  year.  The  poverty  line  is  the  one  adopted  by  the 
Government  of  Moldova  in  2001,  which  was  195  Lei  (Government  of  Moldova,  2004).  The 
poverty line was calculated with a cost of basic needs approach based on a food basket of 2,100 
calories/day and an extra amount calculated for non-food items. The Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP) equivalent value of the 2001 poverty line was approximately 2.5 USD/Day, which is what 




Public and private transfers include the following items extracted from the income section of the 
surveys. Social insurance includes pensions and unemployment benefits although pensions are 
close to the totality of these transfers. Social assistance includes utilities compensations, child 
benefits,  war-veterans  allowances,  social  allowances,  death  grants,  Chernobyl  compensations, 
care-takers  allowances  for  the  disabled,  transport  compensations  for  the  disabled  and  material 
assistance. Social assistance allowances are all categorical allowances. Utilities compensations, 
child  benefits,  war-veterans  allowances  and  social  allowances  account  for  the  greatest  part  of 
expenditure. In 2004, these types of benefits amounted to almost 80% of all social assistance 
benefits.
7 Private transfers include both inter-household transfers and remittances from abroad. 
Remittances  from  abroad  are  much  larger  than  inter-household  transfers  in  terms  of  size  per 
transfer but the number of inter-household transfers is much larger than the number of remittances.   13 
On average and across the population, inter-household transfers represent about 86% of all private 
transfers. A smaller disaggregation of transfers is possible in principle but the representativeness of 
the sample data decreases with the increase in disaggregation. The level of disaggregation chosen 
is the best compromise we could find between within group homogeneity of transfers and sample 
representativeness of each group. 
 
5. Trends and distribution of benefits 
 
This section provides a first set of insights on transfers that should help to better interpret results in 
the  sections  that  follow.  Between  2001  and  2003  household  poverty  has  sharply  declined  in 
Moldova (Table 1, panel A). The headcount ratio estimated at 63% in 2001 was down to 36% in 
2003.
8 The poverty gap ratio more than halved and the severity of poverty ratio in 2003 was a third 
of its 2001 value. Therefore, not only the number of households under the poverty line has dropped 
significantly but also the poverty depth and the severity of poverty for those households living 
below the poverty line have improved. We can also remark that the decline occurred entirely 
between 2001 and 2003 whereas all the three poverty indexes have increased between 2003 and 
2004. It is as if improvements suddenly stalled, a phenomenon that persisted in 2005 and 2006. 
 
If  we  look  at  household  coverage  (Table  1,  panel  B),  wages  have  expanded  with  54%  of 
households receiving at least one wage in 2004 as compared to a figure of 48% in 2001. This does 
not necessarily mean that employment has increased but simply that the number of households 
with at least one wage earner has increased. Coverage has also increased for all transfers: From 
12% to 15% for personal transfers, from 39% to 41% for social insurance and from 7% to 23% for 
social assistance. 
 
In terms of value, all types of incomes from work increased in real terms between 2001 and 2003 
and decreased in 2004 with the exception of wages, which continued to increase in 2004 (Table 1, 
panel C). Both public and private transfers also increased very significantly between 2001 and   14 
2003 and continued to increase in 2004 with the exception of social assistance, which decreases in 
2004. 
 
These  trends  determined  a  structural  change  in  the  sources  of  household  income  away  from 
income from work and finance and towards income from public and private transfers (Table 1, 
panel D). Incomes from work together decreased from 71.5% to 69.4% of total income, income 
from finance decreased from 13.2% to 9.9% while income from transfers (private and public) 
increased from 13.7% to 19.1% of total household income. 
 
In  essence,  wages  have  increased  in  coverage  and  real  value.  Social  insurance  and  personal 
transfers have increased marginally in coverage and significantly in real value and social assistance 
has  increased  steadily  in  both  coverage  and  real  value.  The  result  of  these  changes  is  that 
household welfare has improved but also that household dependency on transfers has increased 




The distribution of transfers is biased in favor of the upper consumption quintiles (Table 2). Only 
about  a  third  of  total  expenditure  on  social  assistance  went  to  the  first  two  quintiles  in  2001 
suggesting that those categories identified by the government as vulnerable are not necessarily 
poor. Targeting of poor households improves between 2001 and 2004 with the first two quintiles 
receiving almost half of total social assistance in 2004 but this share is still evidence of the fact 
that categorical targeting failed to reach the majority of the poor. Social insurance in 2001 was 
more pro-poor than social assistance with around 36% of total expenditure reaching the first two 
quintiles. However, this share remains approximately the same throughout the period with a small 
redistribution  in  favour  of  the  second  quintile.  Personal  transfers  are  the  most  pro-rich  of  the 
transfers with only 13% of these benefits reaching the first two quintiles in 2001 and this share 




In Figure 1, we compare the distributions of wages, social assistance, social insurance and personal 
transfers between 2001 and 2004 using kernel densities.
9 The distribution of wages has a close to 
normal shape and centres around the poverty line, which witnesses the very low wage standards 
existing in Moldova. However, the distribution shifts to the right during the period contributing to 
improve living standards. The distribution for social assistance is right-skewed with most of these 
transfers distributed around very low levels rather far from the poverty line. The distribution shifts 
rightward during the period but in 2004 most observations are still far below the poverty line. For 
those households who are only recipients of social assistance, crossing the poverty line between 
2001 and 2004 would have been very hard despite the improvements. On the contrary, the amounts 
of pensions and personal transfers are much larger and the shift of the distribution over the years 
more marked. The distribution of social insurance is also narrow and close to the poverty line. A 
small shift in the distribution of social insurance can move many households above the poverty 
line, a phenomenon less likely to happen with personal transfers because of the flatter shape of the 
distribution. 
 
The incidence that transfers may have on poverty is evidently limited by the pro-rich distribution 
of both private and public transfers as shown in Table 2. However, based on the distributions 
plotted in Figure 1, we could argue that the transfers’ potential for poverty alleviation is greater for 
social insurance, personal transfers and social assistance in this order. This is a crucial aspect to 
understand  poverty  reduction  in  Moldova.  The  poverty  reduction  capacity  of  transfers  greatly 
depends on the shape of the distributions of transfers and not just on the densities of transfers on 
both sides of the poverty line. Moreover, while we should expect private transfers to cumulate with 
other forms of household income, this is less likely for household recipients of pensions or social 
assistance given that - on average - the members of these households are more likely to be out of 
work.   16 
 
[Figure 1] 
We can also observe from Table 1 and Figure 2 that public transfers do not seem to crowd-out 
private transfers significantly. Both public and private transfers increase in coverage and in real 
terms  between  2001  and  2004  and  the  two  types  of  transfers  are  clearly  positively  correlated 
throughout the period. Also both public and private transfers expand as a share of total income, 
although  the  expansion  of  social  insurance  and  social  assistance  combined  is  larger  than  the 
expansion of private transfers. The relative growth of transfers overall may have displaced other 
forms of incomes but we do not observe a clear crowding-out effect of public transfers over private 
transfers. 
 
6.  Household mobility and the incidence of transfers on poverty 
 
In this section we restrict the data set to panel observations taking two years at a time and using 
transition probabilities matrixes to explore household mobility in and out of the different types of 
transfers and in and out of poverty. By taking only panel observations over periods of two years, 
we restrict the number of households we can use by just over a third of the total sample. Table A1 
in annex provides t-tests comparing means of the balanced (panel) and unbalanced (total) samples 
for each of the two years within each of the three periods considered. If we take a value of three as 
a threshold for the t-test significance, we find a significant difference between panel and total 
samples only for the variable rural and only for the last period 2003-2004. However, this is not a 
major shortcoming in this section as we do not disaggregate by rural and urban areas.
10 
 
When used with a poverty dummy, transition probabilities are also a very useful tool to measure 
the  incidence  of  transfers  on  poverty  and  poverty  transitions  by  simply  subtracting  transition 
probabilities  calculated  in  the  presence  of  transfers  with  those  calculated  in  the  absence  of 
transfers. We can also use these same matrixes to estimate two measures proposed by Ravallion et 
al. (1995) and designed to capture the probability of exiting poverty and the probability of not   17 
falling into poverty. 
 
Let   be our unit of interest - the household - with  ;   an indicator of time with 
;   a binary variable that describes whether households participate   or do not 
participate   to the transfer program. We can identify four groups of households according 
to participation   , which we call ‘Stayouts’ ( ), ‘Joiners’ ( ), ‘Leavers’ ( ), and ‘Stayins’ 
( ) as follows: 
 
Group     
Stayouts  0  0 
Joiners  0  1 
Leavers  1  0 
Stayins  1  1 
 
Based on two years' panels and on the taxonomy provided above, we can construct two types of 
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Pt=2 = 0 
￿ 
Pt=2 =1  Tot 
￿ 
Pt=1 = 0      1   18 
￿ 
Pt=1 =1      1 
Tot      1 
  
Both matrixes are read by row. Matrix   can be used to compare 0->1 transitions (into transfers) 
and 1->0 transitions (out of transfers) as all cells are 'standardized' to the panel population. Matrix 
 is a non-efficient estimation of the more common Markov type of transition matrix. It can be 
used to calculate poverty transitions, the incidence of transfers on poverty and to calculate the 
PROT and PROM tests proposed by Ravallion et al. (1995). These are simple tests to check on the 
capacity of transfers to protect the non-poor from falling into poverty (PROT) and to promote the 
poor moving out of poverty (PROM). To calculate the incidence of transfers on poverty and on 
poverty transitions, it is sufficient to take the difference between the cells values of matrix   
calculated in the presence of transfers and those calculated in the absence of transfers. 
 
The PROT and PROM tests are also easily derived from matrix  . Let   be the share of the 
poor at time   in the presence of social benefits and given a poverty line   and let   be the 
corresponding share in the absence of social benefits. Let also   and   be the shares 
of  those  who  stay  poor  between  the  time  periods  considered.  The  protection  ( )  and 
promotion ( ) tests are defined as: 
 
     [1] 
     [2] 
 
However, given that   by definition (in the pre-benefits period   cannot include 
benefits) the   equation is reduced to: 
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     [3] 
 
Positive values of these measures will indicate that social benefits have been able to protect the 
non-poor from poverty and to promote the poor out of poverty. In the framework of Matrix   
described above,   and   are equal to   while   and   are equal 
to   with   representing the transition probabilities without transfers and   those with 
transfers.  
 
The transition probabilities for matrix   and   are reported in Table 3a and 3b respectively. 
There is a significant mobility within all types of transfers with inflows dominating outflows for all 
transfers and for all time periods considered (Table 3a). This confirms that coverage has been on 
the increase for all transfers and in all time periods. The largest outflows are shown by personal 
transfers while the largest inflows are shown by social assistance. As already noted, the social 
assistance  program  is  the  program  that  has  expanded  the  fastest.  Social  insurance  is  the  least 
'mobile' of the transfers with the lowest inflows and outflows but has also the largest household 
coverage.  Marginal increases in the social insurance program can have large effects on household 
welfare while social assistance would require much larger marginal changes to have an equivalent 




All types of transfers contribute to reduce poverty (Table 3b). Social insurance is the transfer that 
contributes the most. In the absence of social insurance the poverty headcount index would have 
been 11.8% higher in 2002, 13.6% higher in 2003 and 15.6% higher in 2004 (Table 3b, panel A-
C). Personal transfers follow in terms of importance reducing poverty by 4% in 2002, 5.9% in 
2003 and 5.9% in 2004 (Table 3b, panel A-B). The incidence of social assistance is more marginal 
but still positive with 1.6% in 2002, 2.1% in 2003 and 2.4% in 2004 (Table 3b, panel A-D).   20 
 
We can also note that all benefits are able to protect people from poverty and promote an exit from 
poverty  in  all  three  periods  considered  (PROT  and  PROM  tests,  bottom  of  table  3b).  Social 
insurance is the benefit that best contributes to promoting an exit from poverty confirming our 
speculations based on Figure 1. We have already noted that the shape of the distribution of social 
insurance was such that the shift to the right between 2001 and 2004 allowed many households to 
cross the poverty line. On the other hand, the role of social insurance in protecting the non-poor 
from falling into poverty is very marginal. 
 
Personal transfers provide both promotion out of poverty and protection from poverty but in a 
limited  amount  relatively  to  the  other  two  types  of  transfers.  We  saw  that,  despite  the  larger 
amounts of personal transfers, the distribution of these benefits is rather flat and pro-rich, with a 
limited capacity to move a large number of observations across the poverty line. Instead social 
assistance, which is theoretically designed to lift people out of poverty, functions best to protect 
people from poverty. This is probably explained by the very poor targeting of social assistance, 
which we showed to be strongly bias in favour of the non-poor.  
 
In a sense, it is as if social insurance and social assistance had swapped roles in Moldova with 
social assistance functioning as an income protection mechanism and social insurance functioning 
as a poverty alleviation measure. This clearly calls for a major reform of the social assistance 
system,  from  a  categorical  to  a  means-tested  based  system  able  to  better  target  the  poor  and 




7. Parametric estimations 
 
In  this  section  we  exploit  the  four  years’  longitudinal  survey  to  estimate  the  elasticities  of   21 
household consumption to changes in private and public transfers using a fixed effects model. 
Given our data and the implausibility of a proper matching procedure, we are unlikely to improve 
on self-selection but we can improve on unobserved and time-invariant heterogeneity by exploiting 
the longitudinal data and using fixed effects. The model is a standard fixed effects model and is 
described as follows: 
 
￿ 




yit is household consumption per capita,  ,  ,   and 
￿ 
δ are the parameters, µ is the time-
invariant error term,   is the standard error term and   and   stand respectively for households 
and  time.  All  equations  are  estimated  with  an  OLS  estimator  over  the  fours  years  considered 
(2001-2004) using all available observations, panel and non-panel.
11 Therefore, the cross-sectional 
variable is ‘households’ and the longitudinal variable is ‘years’.  
 
  is  a  continuous  measure  of  transfers  expressed  in  units  of  local  currency.  All  monetary 
variables are expressed in real 2001 terms. We will use private transfers, social insurance transfers 
and  social  assistance  transfers  first  jointly  and  then  separately.  This  will  allow  us  to  estimate 
elasticities of consumption conditional and non-conditional on other transfers and speculate in this 
way on whether some transfers have a displacement or crowding-out effect on other transfers.  
 
￿ 
Xit is a vector of household characteristics. The data offered limited choice and we focused on the 
essential characteristics of the head of the household and on the household dependency on working 
individuals. The characteristics of the head of the household are gender (female), age (below or 
equal to thirty years old) and education (tertiary education). The dependency ratio was calculated 
as the share of working individuals in household size. We then split this measure into classes and 
took households with a dependency rate between three and four and households with a dependency 
rate higher than four (these are both dummy variables).    22 
 
￿ 
Ct is a vector of time-varying country characteristics. We included these variables to capture 
essential changes in labour and economic conditions. We included the territorial employment rate 
(this is the employment rate calculated for each of the 46 territorial units covered by the survey) 
and the growth rate (this is the annual GDP growth rate taken from official statistics). Note that 
while for the territorial employment rate we can count on 184 observations (46 units*4 years), we 
have only four observations for the growth rate (4 years).  
 
Results are shown in tables 4, 5 and 6. We look first at the full sample with the transfers variables 
used jointly and separately (Table 4) and later we focus on the poor and extremely poor (Table 5) 
and on rural and urban households (Table 6). 
 
When the three types of transfers are taken jointly, private transfers and social insurance have both 
a positive and significant effect on consumption while social assistance has a positive sign but is 
non significant (Table 4, col. 1). The largest effect is shown by private transfers with a coefficient 
about four times the size of the social insurance coefficient (note that coefficient are small because 
the dependent variable is expressed in natural logarithm of consumption). When taken separately, 
neither private transfers nor social insurance change visibly. Coefficients and significance levels 
are roughly the same of the joint equation suggesting that these variables are rather orthogonal and 
have little displacement effect on each other. This is understandable as private transfers are spread 
across the population while social insurance transfers regard mostly the elderly and, to a minor 
extent, the unemployed. Social assistance benefits continue to be non significant when taken alone. 
This  is  the  smallest  of  the  transfers  in  terms  of  size  and  does  not  seem  to  have  significant 
consumption elasticity on average and for the population at large.  
 
The control variables are largely as expected for a transitional economy, and somewhat different 
from  developing  economies.  Female-headed  households  are  more  likely  to  enjoy  higher 
consumption. In developing economies, the opposite tends to be true but in many transitional   23 
economies of the Former Soviet Union females have done better than men in facing the transition 
process and this result is not atypical. Young age also does not appear to be significant in our 
equations  whereas  youth-headed  households  tend  to  be  poorer  in  many  developing  and 
industrialized countries. In transitional economies, this is not necessarily the case as many young 
people have been able to adapt faster to the changed economic conditions and this outweighs the 
natural increase in income that comes with age.  
 
The rest of the control variables are largely as expected and no different from most other countries. 
Households headed by tertiary educated people are associated with higher levels of consumption as 
compared  to  households  headed  by  lower  educated  people.  Also,  with  increased  household 
dependency  rates,  the  level  of  consumption  per  capita  decreases  as  we  should  expect.  The 
territorial employment rate is negatively associated with household consumption and the annual 
growth rate is positively associated. The local and national economic conditions have evidently an 




In Table 5, we report results restricting the sample to poor and extreme poor households.
12 As we 
work over a four years’ period and with monetary variables expressed in real 2001 terms, we 
consider poor those households with consumption below the official 2001 poverty line throughout 
the period (195.6 Lei per capita per month). In other words, if a household exited poverty between 
2001 and 2004, its contribution to the estimates is limited to the period of poverty. We are looking 
therefore at persistent poverty. The extreme poor are defined in the same manner with a poverty 
line equal to 70% of the official poverty line. This is an arbitrary choice made on the basis of the 
distribution of poor households (we tried to keep the bottom half of poor households). 
 
Looking at poor households (Table 5, upper panel) we find as before that private transfers and 
social  insurance  have  a  significant  and  positive  association  with  consumption  while  social   24 
assistance is non significant. As compared to the full sample, elasticities are marginally higher for 
both private transfers and social insurance. As we should expect, these transfers are more relevant 
in relative terms for the poor than for the full sample.  
 
The difference between joint and separate estimations of transfers is not very large but is larger for 
private transfers as compared to the estimates on the full sample. The elasticity of private transfers 
is marginally smaller if we consider this transfer alone suggesting that there is a small association 
with social insurance transfers. This is likely to regard households located close to the poverty line 
given what we found in relation to the distribution of private transfers and social insurance. Both 
these transfers peaked close to the poverty line and households receiving both types of transfers 
seem to benefit more from private transfers than households who receive only private transfers. 
This suggests that social insurance has not a crowding-out effect on private transfers (which is 
consistent with evidence in other countries – Cox et al., 2004) but that, on the contrary, social 
insurance may reinforce the impact of private transfers on poverty.  
 
Additional insights can be gathered by focusing on the extreme poor (Table 5, bottom panel). For 
this group, the only transfers with a significant sign are private transfers, although the significance 
level is smaller than for the poor or for the full sample. Social insurance is no longer significant 
while social assistance continues to be non significant. The coefficient for private transfers also 
increases by a consistent amount as compared to the sample of poor households (about 50%). In 
essence, with the reduced sample of the extremely poor, we are only able to detect a consistent 
positive effect for private transfers. Only few of the extremely poor receive private transfers given 
the distribution of these transfers but, when they receive them, these are fairly large relatively to 




Next, we turn to rural and urban areas (Table 6). As for the full sample and for both rural and   25 
urban  areas,  we  find  private  transfers  and  social  insurance  to  be  positively  and  significantly 
associated with consumption and social assistance to be non-significant. For private transfers, we 
cannot observe relevant differences between the joint and separate estimations and between rural 
and urban areas. This is remarkable and suggests that remittances derive from people emigrated 
from both urban and rural areas, that inter-household transfers are intense in both areas and that 
these two types of transfers together have a similar effect on consumption for rural and urban 
dwellers.  
 
The  situation  is  different  for  social  insurance.  The  coefficients  for  social  insurance  are  less 
significant for urban areas and they are more than four times larger as compared to rural areas. 
Urban  households  should  be  expected  to  be  richer  and  show  lower  income-consumption 
elasticities. However, social insurance regards for the most part pensions and the elderly. It is 
likely that the elderly living in urban areas can only count on pensions for consumption while the 
elderly living in rural areas have other sources of consumption such as self-production and self-
consumption and can rely on different forms of intra-household distribution of resources. This 
could  explain  the  difference  between  rural  and  urban  households  in  terms  of  size  of  social 
insurance. The lower significance level observed in urban areas as compared to rural areas is 
instead most likely to be explained by the smaller sample (7,399 urban households against 10,612 
rural households). Despite higher levels of poverty in rural areas as compared to urban areas, social 
insurance plays the most prominent role for poverty reduction in urban areas. 
 
[Table 6] 
   
8. Conclusion 
 
Moldova has experienced a remarkable recovery after the deep recession of the 1990s and this 
recovery turned into very significant poverty reduction. The period of output growth and poverty 
reduction has also been accompanied by a significant surge in public and private transfers. The   26 
paper questioned whether these transfers have contributed to improvements in welfare and poverty. 
 
An overview of basic statistics showed that both public and private transfers expanded in terms of 
coverage, real value and relative importance across sources of income. This suggested that public 
transfers did not have a major crowding-out effect on private transfers but that both types of 
transfers may have contributed to displace other sources of income.  
 
An  incidence  evaluation  based  on  transition  probabilities  matrixes  showed  that  all  types  of 
transfers have contributed to reduce poverty with private transfers leading the way followed by 
social insurance and social assistance in this order. We also noted that social insurance and social 
assistance have somehow swapped roles with social assistance functioning as an income protection 
mechanism and social insurance functioning as a poverty alleviation measure.  
 
These findings seem to be explained by both the size and the particular distribution of the three 
types of transfers. Private transfers and social insurance are larger transfers than social assistance 
and they both peak close to the poverty line. The increase in real terms and coverage of these 
transfers produced real benefits for the poor. Social assistance transfers are instead much lower in 
value and peak at very low levels of consumption. Despite the three folds growth in average 
benefit and coverage, this type of transfer remains marginal in lifting the poor out of poverty.  
 
These findings are confirmed by a series of parametric estimates that provide some additional 
insights.  Private  transfers  and  social  insurance  show  positive  and  significant  effects  on 
consumption with private transfers exhibiting the largest and most significant effects and with 
these  effects  being  larger  for  poorer  households.  In  addition,  we  do  not  find  evidence  of 
displacement or crowding-out effects among the different types of transfers considered. That is 
because beneficiaries of the different types of transfers do not overlap to a great extent. When 
private transfers and social insurance do overlap (close to the poverty line) we find that social 
insurance  enhances  marginally  the  capacity  of  private  transfers  to  reduce  poverty.  It  is  also   27 
noteworthy that social insurance works best for poverty alleviation in urban areas rather than rural 
areas. 
 
Social assistance does not appear to have a very relevant impact on welfare or poverty. This may 
be due to the lower amounts and coverage of these transfers as compared to private transfers and 
social insurance transfers. However, it is remarkable that these benefits are not significant when 
we restrict the analysis to the poor or extreme poor confirming that targeting the poor was not a 
major objective of the social assistance program.  
 
We can conclude that there is a clear ranking between the three types of transfers considered. 
Private  transfers  are  the  best  welfare  improving  mechanisms  while  social  insurance  transfers 
function best as poverty alleviation measures. Social assistance benefits come last with a small 
positive role in protecting the non-poor from falling into poverty and a non-significant effect on 
poverty.  
 
These findings suggest that the gains in welfare and poverty reduction observed between 2001 and 
2004 remain very vulnerable to shocks in private and public transfers and that social assistance is 
in great need of restructuring. These two factors may contribute to explain why poverty reduction 
has stalled in Moldova between 2004 and 2007, despite continued growth in output. They also 
suggest that the drop in both private and public transfers may well amplify the impact of the 2008-
2009 crisis on poverty beyond the expected impact due to the reduction in employment and wages. 
 
From a purely public policy perspective the options for the government are limited but should 
focus on turning the social assistance system into a means-tested system and channelling scarce 
resources to the poor. Addressing poverty issues by increasing pensions is effective due to the 
particular distribution of pensions but is very costly and results in significant leakage. The still 
weak system of social insurance contributions does not guarantee sustainability of the pension fund 
and the government cannot continue to finance the pension fund deficit with general taxation.   28 
There  is  some  scope  to  promote  private  transfers  by  simplifying  rules  and  regulations  for 
repatriation  of  capital  but  this  source  of  revenue  is  already  very  large,  mostly  untaxed  and 
informal. Instead, the government could reduce the number of social assistance benefits, increase 
the value of these benefits per capita, make these benefits means-tested and target the poor only. In 
the light of the recent global crisis that greatly affected Moldova, this seems the most sensible 
action to take. 
                                                 
1 See section four for definitions of public and private transfers. 
2 See also Schultz and Strauss (2008) for a comprehensive review of modern evaluation methods. 
3 See http://www.cisstat.com/eng/mac-01.htm 
4  In  an  earlier  version  of  this  paper  we  attempted  a  non-experimental  impact  evaluation  constructing  a 
counterfactual based on a matching procedure and using single and double difference estimates. This proved 
non successful as we were unable to defend the reliability of the matching process, the validity of the 
counterfactual  and  ultimately  the  conditional  independence  hypothesis.  Other  methodologies  such  as 
discontinuity design were also considered but excluded on the basis of available data. 
5 Signoret, J.E. (2003) provides full details on the panel structure and rotation mechanisms. 
6 A higher poverty line of 4.3 USD/Day PPP is also used sometimes by the World Bank. 
7 For a detailed description of public transfers in Moldova see Verme (2007). 
8 Note that these figures differ from the official poverty rates of Moldova because we focus on households 
rather than individuals. 
9 These are obtained with the 'kdensity' command in Stata which, by default, uses the kernel Epanechnikov 
function. The solid line in the centre of each figure represents the poverty line. 
10 When we will disaggregate by urban and rural areas further in the paper we will use all observations, 
panel and non, and this comment on the balanced and unbalanced sample does not apply. 
11 Note that this choice is more efficient than focusing on panel observations only. Keeping only panel 
observations  would  reduce  the  sample  to  little  more  than  800  observations  and  would  compromise  the 
representativeness of the sample. Instead, when keeping all observations, the longitudinal model implicitly 
distinguishes between panel and non-panel observations. 
12 For simplicity of exposition, in the next tables we omit results for the control variables. Some of the 
coefficients of the control variables lose in significance levels as we work with smaller samples but the signs 
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Table 1 - Household Poverty and Income 
              
  2001  2002  2003  2004 
A. Poverty 
Headcount ratio %  63.01  49.11  35.97  37.59 
Poverty gap ratio %  24.47  16.72  10.34  11.08 
Severity of poverty ratio %  12.29  7.60  4.15  4.57 
         
B. Coverage (Population=1) 
Wages  0.48  0.52  0.55  0.54 
Personal transfers  0.12  0.13  0.14  0.15 
Social insurance  0.39  0.41  0.42  0.41 
Social assistance  0.07  0.16  0.21  0.23 
         
C. Average income per month per capita (Lei, real terms) 
Income from work  118.0  150.8  181.2  190.1 
wages  91.2  113.1  134.1  150.6 
agriculture  17.3  26.7  29.0  23.2 
self-employment  4.7  5.2  7.9  7.8 
sales  2.3  2.2  3.7  2.6 
services  2.6  3.7  6.4  5.8 
Income from transfers  22.7  31.1  41.1  52.4 
personal transfers  25.2  37.7  43.3  49.4 
social insurance  20.3  25.8  34.6  46.0 
social assistance  2.4  5.3  6.6  6.3 
Income from finance  21.8  23.9  28.6  27.1 
finance  21.1  23.6  26.9  25.9 
property  0.6  0.4  1.7  1.2 
Other incomes  2.6  3.9  4.0  4.3 
Total incomes  165.1  209.7  255.0  273.8 
         
D. Structure of average income per month per capita (Lei, real terms) 
Income from work  71.5  71.9  71.1  69.4 
wages  55.2  53.9  52.6  55.0 
agriculture  10.5  12.7  11.4  8.5 
self-employment  2.8  2.5  3.1  2.9 
sales  1.4  1.1  1.4  1.0 
services  1.5  1.8  2.5  2.1 
Income from transfers  13.7  14.8  16.1  19.1 
personal transfers  15.3  18.0  17.0  18.1 
social insurance  12.3  12.3  13.6  16.8 
social assistance  1.4  2.5  2.6  2.3 
Income from finance  13.2  11.4  11.2  9.9 
finance  12.8  11.2  10.5  9.5 
property  0.4  0.2  0.7  0.4 
Other incomes  1.6  1.8  1.6  1.6 
Total incomes  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Table 2 - Distribution of Consumption and Transfers by Consumption Quintiles 
              
  2001  2002  2003  2004 
Consumption       
1  9.0  10.1  11.0  10.2 
2  13.6  13.5  14.8  13.6 
3  16.6  16.7  17.2  17.1 
4  21.1  21.5  20.6  21.0 
5  39.8  38.3  36.5  38.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Social Assistance       
1  17.5  17.1  20.5  23.7 
2  17.1  18.7  20.1  23.2 
3  24.3  18.7  20.9  22.4 
4  14.0  21.6  19.5  18.6 
5  27.1  23.9  19.0  12.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Social Insurance       
1  16.9  15.5  18.4  16.8 
2  19.2  20.6  22.0  21.0 
3  21.7  23.0  20.8  23.0 
4  22.1  21.1  20.6  21.6 
5  20.0  19.8  18.2  17.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Personal Transfers       
1  4.8  4.2  5.3  3.9 
2  8.2  8.0  8.7  4.7 
3  10.4  10.3  15.3  10.4 
4  20.7  14.7  17.2  19.0 
5  55.9  62.8  53.5  62.0 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
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Note: The vertical solid line represents the poverty line (ln scale).  35 
 
Table 3a - Transition Probabilities 2001-2004 
                             
  2001-2002  2002-2003  2003-2004 
  0  1  Total  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
A. Personal 
Transfers                    
0  82.4  6.9  89.3  80.0  8.3  88.3  78.2  8.1  86.3 
1  6.6  4.1  10.7  6.7  5.0  11.7  7.2  6.4  13.7 
Total  89.0  11.0  100.0  86.7  13.3  100.0  85.5  14.5  100.0 
B. Social 
Insurance                   
0  55.8  5.0  60.9  54.4  3.4  57.8  54.0  3.6  57.5 
1  2.6  36.5  39.1  2.9  39.3  42.2  2.4  40.0  42.5 
Total  58.4  41.6  100.0  57.3  42.7  100.0  56.4  43.6  100.0 
C. Social 
Assistance                   
0  81.7  11.4  93.1  76.2  9.5  85.7  72.6  7.5  80.1 
1  2.4  4.5  6.9  4.5  9.8  14.3  4.4  15.6  19.9 
Total  84.2  15.8  100.0  80.7  19.3  100.0  77.0  23.0  100.0 
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Table 3b - Transition Probabilities 2001-2004 
                             
  2001-2002  2002-2003  2003-2004 
  0  1  Total  0  1  Total  0  1  Total 
A. Poverty                      
0  74.67  25.33  100  79.71  20.29  100  77.7  22.3  100 
1  37.46  62.54  100  43.86  56.14  100  33.48  66.52  100 
Total  50.84  49.16  100  61.04  38.96  100  61.97  38.03  100 
B. Poverty without personal 
transfers                  
0  71.11  28.89  100  74.88  25.12  100  72.35  27.65  100 
1  34.86  65.14  100  39.67  60.33  100  33.03  66.97  100 
Total  46.8  53.2  100  55.16  44.84  100  56.05  43.95  100 
C. Poverty without social 
insurance                  
0  68.13  31.87  100  74.68  25.32  100  70.26  29.74  100 
1  27.32  72.68  100  31.79  68.21  100  21.8  78.2  100 
Total  39.02  60.98  100  47.46  52.54  100  46.37  53.63  100 
D. Poverty without social 
assistance                  
0  72.43  27.57  100  78.18  21.82  100  76.29  23.71  100 
1  36.46  63.54  100  42.43  57.57  100  31.87  68.13  100 
Total  49.24  50.76  100  58.9  41.1  100  59.55  40.45  100 
A-B. Incidence of personal 
transfers                  
0  -3.6  3.6  0.0  -4.8  4.8  0.0  -5.4  5.4  0.0 
1  -2.6  2.6  0.0  -4.2  4.2  0.0  -0.4  0.5  0.0 
Total  -4.0  4.0  0.0  -5.9  5.9  0.0  -5.9  5.9  0.0 
A-C. Incidence of social 
insurance                  
0  -6.5  6.5  0.0  -5.0  5.0  0.0  -7.4  7.4  0.0 
1  -10.1  10.1  0.0  -12.1  12.1  0.0  -11.7  11.7  0.0 
Total  -11.8  11.8  0.0  -13.6  13.6  0.0  -15.6  15.6  0.0 
A-D. Incidence of social 
assistance                  
0  -2.2  2.2  0.0  -1.5  1.5  0.0  -1.4  1.4  0.0 
1  -1.0  1.0  0.0  -1.4  1.4  0.0  -1.6  1.6  0.0 
Total  -1.6  1.6  0.0  -2.1  2.1  0.0  -2.4  2.4  0.0 
                      
    PROM  PROT     PROM  PROT    PROM  PROT 
Personal transfers  2.6  1.4     4.2  1.7    0.5  5.5 
Social insurance  10.1  0.6     12.1  0.7    11.7  0.8 
Social assistance  1.0  14.0     1.4  17.9     1.6  29.3 
                     37 
 
Table 4 - Consumption equations - full sample 
              
  1  2  3  4 
         
Private Transfers  0.000433***  0.000434***     
  -0.00005  -0.00005     
Social Insurance  0.00102***    0.00104***   
  -0.000297    -0.000305   
Social Assistance  0.000313      0.000376 
  -0.000303      -0.000256 
Head-female  0.0538**  0.0572**  0.0746***  0.0753*** 
  -0.0259  -0.0261  -0.0265  -0.0266 
Head-30 y.o. or less  0.0319  0.0259  0.0481  0.0399 
  -0.0426  -0.0427  -0.0444  -0.0443 
Head-tertiary education  0.119**  0.122**  0.118**  0.122** 
  -0.05  -0.0501  -0.0522  -0.0526 
Household dependency rate (3-4)  -0.166***  -0.167***  -0.156***  -0.160*** 
  -0.0283  -0.0283  -0.0288  -0.029 
Household dependency rate (5+)  -0.142***  -0.116**  -0.118**  -0.0936* 
  -0.0483  -0.0482  -0.0488  -0.0486 
Territorial employment rate  -0.0971**  -0.126***  -0.0925*  -0.121** 
  -0.0481  -0.0475  -0.0487  -0.0482 
GDP growth  3.281***  3.517***  3.345***  3.557*** 
  -0.182  -0.169  -0.184  -0.172 
Constant  1.927***  1.732***  1.856***  1.686*** 
  -0.193  -0.184  -0.195  -0.187 
Observations  24597  24597  24597  24597 
         
R-squared  0.131  0.125  0.108  0.103 
Robust standard errors below coefficients, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
Dep. Var.: Ln Household Consumption per Capita.     
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Table 5 - Consumption equations, poor and extreme poor 
              
  1  2  3  4 
Poor         
         
Private Transfers  0.000506**  0.000482**     
  -0.000199  -0.0002     
Social Insurance  0.00131***    0.00129***   
  -0.000373    -0.000374   
Social Assistance  0.000293      0.000252 
  -0.00051      -0.000507 
Observations  9967  9967  9967  9967 
         
R-squared  0.111  0.105  0.108  0.102 
         
Extreme Poor         
         
Private Transfers  0.000771**  0.000745**     
  -0.000377  -0.000373     
Social Insurance  0.000457    0.000428   
  -0.000561    -0.00056   
Social Assistance  -0.000831      -0.000793 
  -0.00078      -0.000791 
Observations  5027  5027  5027  5027 
         
R-squared  0.117  0.115  0.113  0.113 
Robust standard errors below coefficients, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Control variables omitted. 
Dep. Var.: Ln Household Consumption per Capita. 
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Table 6 - Consumption equations, rural and urban areas 
              
  1  2  3  4 
Rural         
         
Private Transfers  0.000421***  0.000422***     
  -0.00006  -0.00006     
Social Insurance  0.00152***    0.00157***   
  -0.000323    -0.000328   
Social Assistance  0.000341      0.00036 
  -0.00022      -0.000224 
Observations  10612  10612  10612  10612 
         
R-squared  0.129  0.123  0.108  0.102 
         
Urban         
         
Private Transfers  0.000453***  0.000452***     
  -0.00008  -0.00008     
Social Insurance  0.000673**    0.000693**   
  -0.000322    -0.000333   
Social Assistance  0.00037      0.000481 
  -0.00068      -0.000565 
Observations  7399  7399  7399  7399 
         
R-squared  0.154  0.149  0.127  0.123 
Robust standard errors below coefficients, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Control variables omitted. 
Dep. Var.: Ln Household Consumption per Capita. 
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Table A1 - T-Tests for Means, Balanced (Panel) Vs. Unbalanced (Total) Samples 
 
                    
  2001-2002  2002-2003  2003-2004 
Var.  Year 1  Year 2  Year 1  Year 2  Year 1  Year 2 
Poverty headcount  -0.53  1.13  -2.05  -2.42  -0.75  -1.11 
Consumption  0.75  -1.07  2.80  2.80  0.94  1.38 
Private Transfers  1.40  0.20  1.00  1.34  -0.12  0.46 
Social Insurance  0.35  -1.17  0.77  0.53  -0.50  -0.81 
Social Assistance  0.14  -1.44  -0.31  1.02  1.22  -1.33 
Head-female  0.22  0.52  1.50  0.77  0.31  0.37 
Head-30 y.o. or less  0.75  1.97  2.01  0.77  -0.32  1.61 
Head-tertiary education  0.66  0.41  2.16  1.41  1.90  1.60 
HH dependency rate (3-4)  1.97  0.57  0.45  0.78  0.46  0.88 
HH dependency rate (5+)  0.54  0.08  0.55  -0.51  0.03  0.46 
Territorial empl. rate  -1.21  -0.85  -0.80  -0.04  -0.30  -0.30 
Rural  -2.17  -1.85  -2.64  -2.45  -3.38  -3.44 
Panel observations  2469  2469  1716  1716  2404  2404 
Total observations  6217  6159  6159  6123  6123  6121 
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